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Violence, Self-Authorship aŶd the ͚Death of God͛: The ͚Traps͛ of the MessiaŶiĐ aŶd the TragiĐ 




NietzsĐhe͛s heƌaldiŶg of the ͚Death of God͛ aŶŶouŶĐes aŶd eǆposes the ĐoŶditioŶ of 
foundationlessness underpinning (Western) modernity and provokes the crucial question of the 
goals and purposes of political life. Without the figure of the divine as sanction and guide, political 
society lacks a stable foundation upon which to identify and legitimate itself. This paper explores the 
respective responses of two traditions of critical thought which engage explicitly with the challenges 
this poses, ŶaŵelǇ the ŵessiaŶiĐ aŶd the tƌagiĐ. The ĐeŶtƌal aiŵ is to tƌaĐe a seƌies of ͚tƌaps͛ iŶ 
evidence in both messianic and tragic thought which lead them to (re)turn to particular forms of 
transcendentalism; both traditions, it is argued, turn towards the divine in their responses to the 
͚Death of God͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the papeƌ suggests that ǁhile the ŵessiaŶic is inextricably bound up in 
such a return to the divine, the tragic, as well as comprising several problematic violences, retains a 
particular salience in theorising subjectivity and the political under the condition of 
fouŶdatioŶlessŶess Ŷaŵed ďǇ the ͚Death of God͛. 
 
Introduction 
NietzsĐhe͛s pƌoĐlaŵatioŶ of the ͚Death of God͛, uŶdeƌstood ďoth as aŶ oďseƌǀatioŶ aŶd aŶ 
affirmation, poses profound and enduring questions for the political, broadly understood. As the 
Introduction to this forum demonstrates, far from a concrete and temporally confined historical 
eǀeŶt, the ͚Death of God͛ has Đoŵe to fuŶĐtioŶ iŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‘elatioŶs ;I‘Ϳ aŶd assoĐiated 
disciplines as a shorthand by means of which to refer to the foundationless or abyssal nature of the 
(post)modern condition, in which appeals to the divine, the transcendental, or the universal as a 
guide to political thought and action have become radically problematic.1 Despite the far-reaching 
ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of suĐh ŵetaphǇsiĐal disƌuptioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, NietzsĐhe͛s thought and the specifics of his 
Đlaiŵ of the ͚Death of God͛ haǀe ƌeĐeiǀed oŶlǇ liŵited atteŶtioŶ iŶ I‘. With Ŷotaďle eǆĐeptioŶs, 
including the work of James der Derian2 and William Connolly,3 Nietzsche has tended to remain 
somewhat marginal in the discipliŶe aŶd, ǁhile the ͚Death of God͛ tƌope is iŶǀoked iŶteƌŵitteŶtlǇ as 
a sǇŶoŶǇŵ foƌ ŵodeƌŶitǇ͛s fouŶdatioŶlessŶess, it has Ŷot ďeeŶ tƌeated eǆteŶsiǀelǇ as aŶ oďjeĐt of 
study in its own right. This is problematic, however, not least because, as Chris Brown observes, 
͚NietzsĐhe͛s stƌess oŶ the deep, ďut laƌgelǇ uŶƌeĐogŶised, sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of the ͞death of God͟ 
prefigures twentieth century anti-fouŶdatioŶalisŵ.͛ϰ As foƌŵs of ĐƌitiĐal thought assoĐiated ǁith 
anti-foundationalism continue to expand in influence and popularity within IR, a detailed exploration 
of this inheritance would seem to be of some import. The paper seeks to address this anti-
foundationalist inheritance via an exploration of the ethico-political implications of two broad tones 
of response to the ĐhalleŶges assoĐiated ǁith the ͚Death of God͛ at ǁoƌk iŶ ĐƌitiĐal I‘ todaǇ, ŶaŵelǇ 
the ͚ŵessiaŶiĐ͛ aŶd the ͚tƌagiĐ͛. 
The importance of this in the context of IR relates to the question of violence. Within those geo-
cultural contexts affected by it,5 the ͚Death of God͛ iŶǀokes Ŷot siŵplǇ the destaďilisatioŶ of a 
particular set of established social conventions in themselves, but rather poses the far more 
extensive challenge of the removal of the possibility of divine sanction for any such configuration. 
The ͚Death of God͛ thus aŵouŶts to aŶ oŶgoiŶg seƌies of ǀioleŶt ƌuptuƌes. These aƌe ǀioleŶt ďoth iŶ 
the sense that connections to the divine, and to the earthly community bound together by the 
divine, are compromised, and because they provoke the need for meaning and subjectivity to be 
established and maintained via means other than transcendental or divine guarantee. If particular 
(Western) forms or modes of be(com)ing are decoupled from legitimating connections to the divine 
or the universal as a consequeŶĐe of the oŶgoiŶg ƌuptuƌes Đaused ďǇ aŶd Đausal of the ͚Death of 
God͛, the possiďilitǇ of aŶǇ foƌŵ of defeŶsiďilitǇ ďased oŶ the tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal is uŶdeƌŵiŶed. TakiŶg 
seriously the indefensibility that arises from this is to take seriously the problem that such 
be(com)ing is not benign but rather a violent process predicated on necessarily indefensible 
pƌiŶĐiples aŶd pƌeŵises. As MiĐhael DilloŶ Ŷotes of JaĐƋues Deƌƌida͛s thought, the latteƌ sought to 
eǆpose the ǀioleŶĐe that ͚is sutuƌed iŶto the ǀeƌǇ faďƌiĐ of the ǁoƌld … [ďeĐause] eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁe do is 
iƌƌesolǀaďlǇ iŵpliĐated iŶ ǀioleŶĐe.͛ϲ As a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of the ƌuptuƌes assoĐiated ǁith the ͚Death of 
God͛, ďe;ĐoŵͿiŶg is ǀioleŶt ďoth ďeĐause eǀeƌǇ deĐisioŶ to puƌsue a paƌtiĐulaƌ eŶd oƌ ǀalue is to the 
exclusion of every other such end or value, and because such a decision locates and defends itself 
via points of reference that are themselves indefensible. The ethical imperative thus emerges to 
mark, respond to, and theorise this violence. 
Taking its prompt from such an injunction, this paper engages with two broad traditions of thought 
ǁhiĐh ƌespoŶd to the aďǇssal ĐoŶditioŶ ǁhiĐh the ͚Death of God͛ iŶǀokes: the ŵessiaŶiĐ aŶd the 
tragic. In different ways, messianic and tragic thought can both be read as important responses to 
this foundationlessness, as their respective widespread influence throughout various critical 
traditions within IR and related disciplines attests. Common to both is an engagement with the vast 
aŶd uƌgeŶt pƌoďleŵ posed ďǇ the ͚Death of God͛ of the ͚foƌ the sake of͛ of politiĐal life; as NietzsĐhe 
Đlaiŵs, the ͚Death of God͛ ƌaises the ƋuestioŶ of ͚foƌ ǁhat?͛ϳ Without diǀiŶe oƌ tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal 
meanings provided by God, stable values and goals from which society may take its bearings are lost. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ, uŶdeƌ this ĐoŶditioŶ of fouŶdatioŶlessŶess the ͚foƌ ǁhat͛ of the politiĐal ĐaŶ, NietzsĐhe 
argues, be sourced either from some external point of reference or sought within the subject itself. 
He explains: 
The ƋuestioŶ ͚foƌ ǁhat?͛ is ƌooted iŶ the old habit of supposing that the goal must be put up, 
given, demanded from outside – by some superhuman authority. Having unlearned faith in 
that, one still follows the old habit and seeks another authority that can speak 
unconditionally and command goals and tasks. The authority of conscience now steps up 
front (the more emancipated one is from theology, the more imperativistic morality 
becomes) to compensate for the loss of a personal authority.8 
What this suggests is that Nietzsche identified two broad tendencies provoked by the ongoing 
ƌuptuƌes of the ͚Death of God͛: eitheƌ the ͚foƌ ǁhat͛ ŵust ďe fouŶd iŶ soŵe ͚outside͛ authoƌitǇ oƌ 
ǀalue, oƌ alteƌŶatiǀelǇ it ŵaǇ ďe sought ͚iŶside͛, fƌoŵ ǁithiŶ the ͚ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛ of the suďjeĐt itself. The 
paper begins fƌoŵ NietzsĐhe͛s aĐĐouŶt of these tǁo ƌespoŶses to the ͚Death of God͛ ďǇ ideŶtifǇiŶg iŶ 
ĐuƌƌeŶt ĐƌitiĐal thought fiƌstlǇ a ͚ƌeaĐhiŶg outǁaƌd͛ iŶ seaƌĐh of the ͚foƌ ǁhat͛ ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ of 
ŵessiaŶiĐ thought, aŶd seĐoŶdlǇ a ͚tuƌŶiŶg iŶǁaƌds͛ as a paƌt of suĐh a search, a tone discernible in 
the tragic. 
The ĐeŶtƌal ĐoŶĐeƌŶ of this papeƌ is to tƌaĐe the diffeƌeŶt foƌŵs of ǀioleŶĐes oƌ ͚tƌaps͛ assoĐiated 
with messianic and tragic responses to conditions of foundationlessness. It argues that both the 
messianic and the tragic ultimately invoke and rely upon standards and categories which, according 
to their own interior logics, are rendered indefensible by the ongoing metaphysical destabilisations 
sigŶified ďǇ the ͚Death of God͛. Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, thƌough aŶ eŶgagement with the messianic 
thought of Jacques Derrida and the accounts of the tragic provided by Michael Dillon and Friedrich 
NietzsĐhe ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ, the papeƌ suggests that the ͚ƌeaĐhiŶg outǁaƌds͛ of the ŵessiaŶiĐ leads to a 
problematic re-entanglement in the tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal, ǁhile the ͚iŶǁaƌdŶess͛ of the tƌagiĐ at least ƌisks 
an acute and potentially colonising self-referentiality, a political quietism or fatalism, and ultimately, 
albeit in a different way to the messianic, also a return to the transcendental. It will be shown, 
however, that an agonistic engagement with these traditions is important in responding to the 
politiĐal iŵpliĐatioŶs of ĐhalleŶges posed ďǇ the ͚Death of God͛; it is suggested that the tƌagiĐ iŶ 
particular retains significant purchase in theorising the violence of be(com)ing in light of the ongoing 
ƌuptuƌes the ͚Death of God͛ Ŷaŵes. 
 
The ͚Death of God͛, the SuiĐide of ͚MaŶ͛ aŶd the Be;ĐoŵͿiŶg of the SuďjeĐt 
In the geo-Đultuƌal ĐoŶteǆts ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh the ͚Death of God͛ has ďeeŶ deĐlaƌed, a severing of the 
connections between the earthly realm of the human and the divine world of God is suggested. As 
AƌŵaŶdo “alǀatoƌe Ŷotes, ͚[ŵ]odeƌŶ gloďal soĐietǇ is heiƌ to a fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌuptuƌe iŶ huŵaŶ 
history, through which the human grasp of symbols of godly majesty and divine intervention on both 
Ŷatuƌe aŶd huŵaŶ soĐietǇ is ƌeplaĐed ďǇ a ƌefleǆiǀe ƌatioŶalizatioŶ of theiƌ ŵeaŶiŶg.͛ Foƌ soŵe, he 
ĐoŶtiŶues, this has ďeeŶ ǁelĐoŵed as ͚a sǁift tƌaŶsitioŶ fƌoŵ ŵǇthos to logos,͛ ǁhile ďǇ otheƌs it has 
been ͚deĐƌied as the pƌogƌessiǀe liƋuidatioŶ of huŵaŶ ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ aŶd its iŶĐoƌpoƌatioŶ iŶto the iƌoŶ 
cage of the power-satuƌated, aŶoŶǇŵous ƌelatioŶs of gloďal ŵodeƌŶitǇ.͛ϵ Foƌ ďetteƌ oƌ ǁoƌse, ǁhat 
these ongoing ruptures suggest is that the subject can no longer rely upon divine points of reference 
as a ŵeaŶs ďǇ ǁhiĐh to asĐeƌtaiŶ ŵeaŶiŶg, ǀalue oƌ diƌeĐtioŶ; ǁith the ͚Death of God͛, ͚[ǁ]hat has 
died is the ͞ƌealitǇ͟ of aŶ oƌdeƌ of eǆisteŶĐe that is ͞otheƌ͟ thaŶ self-perception and subjective 
appƌopƌiatioŶ.͛ϭϬ As Heideggeƌ siŵilaƌlǇ fƌaŵes it, if ͚God as the supƌaseŶsoƌǇ gƌouŶd aŶd goal of all 
reality is dead, if the supresensory world of the Ideas has suffered the loss of its obligatory and 
above all its vitalizing and upbuilding power, then nothing remains to which man can cling and by 
ǁhiĐh he ĐaŶ oƌieŶt hiŵself.͛ϭϭ The ͚Death of God͛ ǁould seeŵ, theŶ, to aŵouŶt to the ďƌeakiŶg of 
the links between the subject and divinely sanctioned modes of thought and being. 
NietzsĐhe͛s eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith this ƌuptuƌe ĐoŵďiŶes tones of awe and affirmation. He celebrates it at 
least in part because in his view the assumed connection between man and the divine was never in 
ƌealitǇ possiďle. He suggests that faƌ fƌoŵ eŶjoǇiŶg suĐh a tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal ƌelatioŶ, ͚MaŶ͛ ƌatheƌ 
mistook his ͚iŶŶeƌ ǁoƌld͛, pƌediĐated oŶ his ego, foƌ BeiŶg. This eƌƌoƌ led hiŵ to ďelieǀe iŶ a ƌealitǇ 
͚outside͛ hiŵself that ĐoƌƌespoŶded to his ego. Foƌ NietzsĐhe, ǁhat the ͚Death of God͛ ultiŵatelǇ 
demonstrates is not a fundamentally new condition in which the connection to the divine has been 
lost, but rather that what the subject had previously taken to be an independently existing reality 
͚outside͛ ǁas oŶlǇ eǀeƌ a pƌojeĐtioŶ of itself: 
MaŶ pƌojeĐted his thƌee ͚iŶŶeƌ faĐts of ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛, the ǁill, the spiƌit, and the ego, in which 
he believed most firmly, outside. He first deduced the concept of Being out of the concept of 
Ego, he supposed ͚thiŶgs͛ to eǆist as he did hiŵself, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to his ŶotioŶ of the ego as 
Đause … The thiŶg itself, I ƌepeat, the ĐoŶĐept ͚thiŶg͛ ǁas ŵeƌelǇ a ƌefleǆ of the ďelief iŶ the 
ego as Đause … [This] eƌƌoƌ of spiƌit [ǁas] ƌegaƌded as a Đause, [aŶd] ĐoŶfouŶded ǁith 
reality! And made the measure of reality! And called God!12 
Thus, for Nietzsche, far from enjoying a connection with the divine, the subject had succeeded only 
in projecting its own ego outward and had mistakenly construed this for a reality independent of 
itself; the subject deduced grand ideas about Being by inflating itself to resemble something greater, 
so great, in fact, that it gaǀe it the Ŷaŵe ͚God͛. The death of this God ƌeŶdeƌs this pƌoĐess of 
projection apparent, according to Nietzsche. The result of this is that the subject loses its (illusory) 
ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ to the diǀiŶe: ͚ŵaŶ has ďeĐoŵe iŶĐapaďle of appƌeheŶdiŶg a ƌeality absolutely 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt of hiŵself aŶd of haǀiŶg a ƌelatioŶ ǁith it.͛ϭϯ As suĐh, the ͚Death of God͛ eǆposes oŶlǇ 
what was already the case: the subject must generate meaning without recourse to standards 
sanctioned by divine licence. 
Importantly, what this also means is that, as well as undermining the supposed connections between 
the huŵaŶ aŶd the diǀiŶe, the ͚Death of God͛ siŵultaŶeouslǇ alieŶates the suďjeĐt fƌoŵ the 
ĐoŵŵuŶal, eaƌthlǇ ƌealŵ ͚outside͛ of itself. As oƌigiŶatoƌ of the shaƌed ǀalues ǁhich had 
underpinned society hitherto, God had previously made possible a meaningful connection between 
the individual and the community. With the death of this origin and sustaining force, these collective 
bonds are severed, and the subject loses recourse to shared mores outside itself. The subject is then 
left to its oǁŶ deǀiĐes to ŵake seŶse of eǆisteŶĐe; JaĐoď Tauďes Ŷotes Hegel͛s Đlaiŵ that suĐh 
pheŶoŵeŶa as philosophǇ eŵeƌge ͚ǁheŶ a gulf has aƌiseŶ ďetǁeeŶ iŶǁaƌd stƌiǀiŶgs aŶd eǆteƌŶal 
reality, and the old foƌŵs of ƌeligioŶ etĐ. aƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ satisfǇiŶg.͛ϭϰ The ŵeasuƌe of ǀalue aŶd 
meaning must, henceforth, be found not through commonly shared understandings of the sacred or 
the diǀiŶe, ďut ƌatheƌ thƌough the suďjeĐt͛s oǁŶ faĐulties, thƌough ƌeasoŶ aŶd conscience. Such 
ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe is ͚iŶǁaƌd, ďut eǆists iŶ ĐoŶstaŶt teŶsioŶ ǁith the ǁoƌld, foƌĐiŶg us to ďƌidge the gap 
ďetǁeeŶ it aŶd the ƌealŵ of the ǁoƌld.͛ϭϱ 
These ruptures with the divine and the earthly communal occur not simply as a consequence of 
God͛s death ďut ƌatheƌ of His ŵuƌdeƌ. NietzsĐhe is eǆpliĐit that the ͚Death of God͛ is aŶ aĐt of 
deiĐide: ͚We haǀe killed hiŵ – Ǉou aŶd I! We aƌe his ŵuƌdeƌeƌs.͛ϭϲ “uĐh deiĐide is, foƌ NietzsĐhe, aŶ 
uŶpaƌalleled ŵoŵeŶt iŶ histoƌǇ: ͚Theƌe ǁas Ŷeǀeƌ a gƌeateƌ deed – and whoever is born after us will 
oŶ aĐĐouŶt of this deed ďeloŶg to a higheƌ histoƌǇ thaŶ all histoƌǇ up to Ŷoǁ!͛ϭϳ NothiŶg less thaŶ 
the ǁoƌld is saǀed, NietzsĐhe Đlaiŵs, ďǇ this ͚gƌeatest ƌeĐeŶt eǀeŶt … that the ďelief iŶ the ChƌistiaŶ 
God has become uŶďelieǀaďle.͛ϭϴ This gƌeat aĐt of deiĐide oĐĐuƌs, Heideggeƌ shoǁs, ďeĐause ͚MaŶ 
eŶteƌs iŶto iŶsuƌƌeĐtioŶ.͛ϭϵ Thƌough this iŶsuƌƌeĐtioŶ, the suďjeĐt͛s status shifts fƌoŵ oŶe of ͚ďeiŶg-
ǁƌitteŶ͛ ďǇ staŶdaƌds aŶd Ŷoƌŵs the ǀalue of ǁhiĐh ǁeƌe iŶheƌited ƌather than chosen, to one of 
͚self-authoƌship͛, iŶ ǁhiĐh, ďǇ ǀiƌtue of its ĐhoosiŶg of theŵ, the suďjeĐt ďestoǁs ŵeaŶiŶg oŶ suĐh 
pƌiŶĐiples. As suĐh, ͚[t]he eaƌth, as the aďode of ŵaŶ, is uŶĐhaiŶed fƌoŵ the suŶ. The ƌealŵ that 
constitutes the supresensory, which as such, is in itself[,] no longer stands over man as the 
authoƌitatiǀe light … That ǁhiĐh is, as the oďjeĐtiǀe, is sǁalloǁed up iŶto the iŵŵaŶeŶĐe of 
suďjeĐtiǀitǇ. The hoƌizoŶ Ŷo loŶgeƌ eŵits light of itself.͛ϮϬ 
Consequently, while the vastness of this act is clear, it is also devastating. As Heidegger explains, 
thinking in terms of values is radical killing. It not only strikes down that which is as such, in 
its being-in-itself, ďut it does aǁaǇ utteƌlǇ ǁith BeiŶg … The ǀalue-thinking of the 
metaphysics of the will to power is murderous in a most extreme sense, because it 
absolutely does not let Being itself take rise, i.e. come into the vitality of its essence. 
Thinking in terms of values precludes in advance that Being itself will attain to a coming to 
presence in its truth.21 
Thus, along with God, Being is also murdered. With no possibility of redemption or repentance, 
because God remains dead, is not resurrected, the ongoing murder of God is thus, in an important 
seŶse, ͚MaŶ͛s͛ suiĐide. BǇ ͚MaŶ͛, I intend to suggest the human (within the geo-cultural contexts in 
question) understood as something in particular, a mode or form of being which inherits and is 
constructed via divine and communal inheritances which provide external justifications for the 
suďjeĐt. IŶ Heideggeƌ͛s ǁoƌds, 
[t]hat which formerly conditioned and determined the essence of man in the manner of 
purpose and norm has lost its unconditional and immediate, above all its ubiquitously and 
infallibly operative power of effective action. That suprasensory world of purposes and 
Ŷoƌŵs Ŷo loŶgeƌ ƋuiĐkeŶs aŶd suppoƌts life … That is the ŵetaphǇsiĐal ŵeaŶiŶg of the ǁoƌd 
͚God is dead,͛ thought ŵetaphǇsiĐallǇ.ϮϮ 
Thus, iŶ ŵuƌdeƌiŶg God, ͚MaŶ͛s͛ Đlaiŵ to BeiŶg is also killed. ͚MaŶ͛ theƌeďǇ Đoŵŵits suiĐide. IŶ 
FouĐault͛s ǁoƌds, ͚NietzsĐhe ƌedisĐoǀeƌed the poiŶt at ǁhiĐh ŵaŶ aŶd God ďeloŶg to oŶe aŶotheƌ, at 
ǁhiĐh the death of the seĐoŶd is sǇŶoŶǇŵous ǁith the disappeaƌaŶĐe of the fiƌst … It is Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
possible to thiŶk iŶ ouƌ daǇ otheƌ thaŶ the ǀoid left ďǇ ŵaŶ͛s disappeaƌaŶĐe.͛Ϯϯ What ƌeŵaiŶs is aŶ 
underdetermined subject-to-be(come) which has precluded from itself points of reference from 
ǁhiĐh its ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd selfhood ŵaǇ ďe iŶfeƌƌed. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, ͚iŶ this event man also becomes 
different. He becomes the one who does away with that which is, in the sense of that which is in 
itself. The upƌisiŶg of ŵaŶ iŶto suďjeĐtiǀitǇ tƌaŶsfoƌŵs that ǁhiĐh is iŶto oďjeĐt.͛Ϯϰ IŶ Tauďes͛ teƌŵs, 
ŵaŶ ŵoǀes fƌoŵ ͚Ŷatuƌe͛ to ͚histoƌǇ͛ thƌough aŶ eǆeƌĐise of this teƌƌiďle fƌeedoŵ: ͚OŶlǇ ŵaŶkiŶd͛s 
answer [Antwort] to the word of God, which is essentially a negative one [ein Nein], is evidence of 
huŵaŶ fƌeedoŵ. Theƌefoƌe, the fƌeedoŵ of ŶegatioŶ is the fouŶdatioŶ of histoƌǇ.͛Ϯϱ 
In this ƌeadiŶg, the ͚Death of God͛ thus siŵultaŶeouslǇ pƌoǀokes aŶd Đoŵpƌoŵises the suďjeĐt͛s self-
authored be(com)ing. On the one hand, it makes possible a willed and agential production of 
suďjeĐtiǀitǇ: it Đoŵpƌises a Đall to ͚ďeĐoŵe ǁho ǁe aƌe – human beings who are unique, 
iŶĐoŵpaƌaďle, ǁho giǀe theŵselǀes laǁs, ǁho Đƌeate theŵselǀes.͛Ϯϲ As suĐh self-creating agents, 
suďjeĐts attaiŶ a Ŷeǁ aŶd, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Heideggeƌ, supeƌioƌ foƌŵ of eǆisteŶĐe: ͚huŵaŶitǇ ǁhiĐh ǁills 
its oǁŶ ďeiŶg huŵaŶ … is deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ a foƌŵ of ŵaŶ͛s esseŶĐe that goes ďeǇoŶd aŶd suƌpasses 
ŵaŶ hitheƌto.͛Ϯϳ OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚MaŶ͛s͛ aĐt of deiĐide is also aŶ aĐt of suiĐide: as a 
consequence of the undermining of enduring points of reference from which the subject might take 
its ďeaƌiŶgs, it is foƌĐed to seƌǀe as the oŶlǇ aǀailaďle staŶdaƌd ďǇ ǁhiĐh to judge. ͚MaŶ͛, uŶdeƌstood 
as something in particular, is thereby undermined. Instead, the underdetermined subject must 
affirm selfhood, values, meanings, without access to stable principles, guides or inheritances. This 
ruptured subject and this paradoxical and vertiginous process pose a crucial question regarding the 
ethico-political implications of self-authorship under conditions of foundationlessness brought about 
ďǇ the ͚Death of God͛: ǁheƌe ŵight the suďjeĐt seek out the teƌŵs aŶd ǀalues ǀia ǁhiĐh it ŵaǇ self-
Đƌeate? As Ŷoted pƌeǀiouslǇ, NietzsĐhe ideŶtified tǁo possiďilities, a ͚ƌeaĐhiŶg outǁaƌd͛ toǁaƌds 
shared norms, even after such mores have been shown to be indefensible, and a ͚tuƌŶiŶg iŶǁaƌds͛ 
toǁaƌds the ͚iŶŶeƌ ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛. IŶ oƌdeƌ to eǆploƌe this ƋuestioŶ, the politiĐal iŵpliĐatioŶs of 
Deƌƌida͛s ŵessiaŶiĐ thought, iŶ ǁhiĐh the foƌŵeƌ is iŶ eǀideŶĐe, aŶd DilloŶ aŶd NietzsĐhe͛s 
respective engagements with the tragic, wherein the latter can be perceived, may be fruitfully 
explored. 
 
Messianic PolitiĐs aŶd the ͚Death of God͛ 
Deƌƌida͛s ͚ŵessiaŶiĐ tuƌŶ͛ has ďeeŶ ǁidelǇ disĐussed ǁithiŶ I‘ aŶd ďeǇoŶd. IŶ Gil AŶidjaƌ͛s ǁoƌds, 
Deƌƌida has ďeeŶ ǀieǁed as ͚peƌfoƌŵiŶg aĐts of ƌeligioŶ, as eŶaĐtiŶg a ƌetuƌŶ to his oǁŶ ͞ƌeligious͟ 
oƌigiŶs, though ǁith the ĐoŶstƌaiŶts of a ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ĐoŵpliĐated ƌeappƌopƌiatioŶ.͛Ϯϴ While theŵes 
of the religious and the sacred may have always operated within his thought insofar, for instance, as 
͚DeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is the ͞heƌŵeŶeutiĐ͟ of the death of God,͛Ϯϵ the self-conscious introduction of a 
paƌtiĐulaƌ foƌŵ of ŵessiaŶiĐ iŵagiŶaƌǇ iŶto Deƌƌida͛s lateƌ ǁoƌk pƌoǀides aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ĐoŶteǆt 
within which the ethico-political implications of messianic thought might be addressed. As Dillon 
shows, few thinkers have struggled as relentlessly as Derrida with multiple forms and manifestations 
of ǀioleŶĐe, as shoǁŶ iŶ his ͚ƌefusal [of] all safe ĐoŶduĐt to good ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe iŶ ƌelatioŶ to 
ǀioleŶĐe.͛ϯϬ The ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeen the messianic and violence is crucial in the context of 
Deƌƌida͛s stƌuggle: 
One does not raise the issue of violence in order to discredit the messianic. One raises the 
ŵessiaŶiĐ iŶ oƌdeƌ to iŶteƌƌogate, ǁithout ƌeseƌǀe … the iŶesĐapaďle ǀioleŶĐe of eǆistence 
and the challenges it poses to all thinking concerning the possibility of justice; including that 
of the thought of the messianic itself.31 
Variously celebrated and critiqued, the messianic has comprised part of a broader (re)turn to 
religion in receŶt CoŶtiŶeŶtal aŶd ĐƌitiĐal thought, ďoth ǁithiŶ aŶd ďeǇoŶd I‘: the ͚death of the 
death of God͛ has ďeeŶ ŵaƌked ďǇ the shift fƌoŵ the seĐulaƌ to the ͚post-seĐulaƌ.͛ϯϮ Deƌƌida͛s 
relationship with this turn is an uneasy one. On the one hand, he explicitly advocated the evacuation 
of ƌeligioŶ fƌoŵ foƌŵal politiĐal estaďlishŵeŶts, ĐlaiŵiŶg that ͚it is out of ƌespeĐt foƌ ƌeligioŶ that ǁe 
must dissociate things and that we must cease to lead politics in the name of religion, or under the 
authority of religion, oƌ soŵetiŵes uŶdeƌ the authoƌitǇ of ƌeligious authoƌities theŵselǀes.͛ϯϯ OŶ 
the otheƌ haŶd, hoǁeǀeƌ, he eŵploǇs aŶ eǆteŶsiǀe ƌeligious ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ ǁhiĐh ͚seeŵs so 
omnipresent and developed in his work that it would be easy to conclude that Derrida too took the 
faŵous theologiĐal tuƌŶ iŶ FƌeŶĐh pheŶoŵeŶologǇ.͛ϯϰ His use of suĐh laŶguage eǆteŶds to iŶǀokiŶg 
aďsolute oƌ uŶdeĐoŶstƌuĐtiďle ĐoŶĐepts aŶiŵated ďǇ it: ͚ǁhat ƌeŵaiŶs iƌƌeduĐiďle to aŶǇ 
deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, 
perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a 
stƌuĐtuƌal ŵessiaŶisŵ.͛ϯϱ At the ƌoot of Deƌƌida͛s iŶǀoĐatioŶ of suĐh ŶotioŶs is aŶ atteŵpt to 
evacuate the substantive content of the religious and theological devises he employs, advocating 
͚ŵessiaŶisŵ ǁithout ƌeligioŶ, eǀeŶ a ŵessiaŶiĐ ǁithout ŵessiaŶisŵ, aŶ idea of justiĐe.͛ϯϲ 
Foƌ Deƌƌida, the ŵessiaŶiĐ is paƌt of, oƌ ƌefleĐtiǀe of, the ďƌoadeƌ stƌuĐtuƌe of the ͚to Đoŵe͛, the 
never-fulfilled promise of the possibility of a never-present future justice, democracy or arrivant. His 
is Ŷot a ŵessiaŶiĐitǇ ͚deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ the ǁaǇ that, iŶ the Biďle, ǁe defiŶe the Messiah oƌ 
ŵessiaŶisŵ.͛ ‘atheƌ, the ͚ŵessiaŶiĐ is a geŶeƌal stƌuĐtuƌe iŶ ǁhiĐh the ͞to Đoŵe͟ is aďsolutelǇ 
undetermined, absolutely undetermined, and of course I cannot close, I cannot circumscribe this 
ƌelatioŶ to the ͞to Đoŵe͟.͛ϯϳ What he iŶteŶds to iŶǀoke is a ͚thiŶkiŶg that ͞ƌepeats͟ the possiďilitǇ of 
religion without religioŶ.͛ϯϴ The distiŶĐtiǀe aŶd ĐƌuĐial diŵeŶsioŶ of this ƌeligiositǇ ǁithout dogŵa is 
the stƌuĐtuƌe of the ͚pƌoŵise͛: ͚the ŵessiaŶisŵ ǁe aƌe speakiŶg aďout is oŶe ǁithout esĐhatologǇ, 
without pregiven promised land, without determinate content. It is simply the structure of a promise 
ǁhiĐh is iŶheƌeŶt iŶ all eǆpeƌieŶĐe.͛ϯϵ As the ƌepetitioŶs of ͚stƌuĐtuƌe͛ iŶ the aďoǀe ƋuotatioŶs shoǁ, 
Derrida attempts to remove the dogmatic content of the messianic while retaining the structural 
function of it, the structure of the pƌoŵise.ϰϬ What this ƌesults iŶ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Nass, is ͚aŶ oƌigiŶaƌǇ 
or radical secularity that includes a critique or questioning of religious dogma by means of a more 
pƌiŵoƌdial oƌ oƌigiŶaƌǇ faith͛.ϰϭ IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, it is aŶ uŶdeƌlǇiŶg faith ǁhiĐh animates both 
disruptive deconstructive interventions into knowledge, religion, metaphysics and so forth, and the 
stƌuĐtuƌal pƌoŵise ǁhiĐh the ͚to Đoŵe͛ is pƌediĐated upoŶ. “uĐh a faith is the ŶeĐessaƌǇ ĐoŶditioŶ, 
for Nass, of the coming of the event, the otheƌ, aŶd the politiĐal.ϰϮ IŶ Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌds, this 
abstract messianicity belongs from the very beginning to the experience of faith, of 
ďelieǀiŶg, of a Đƌedit that is iƌƌeduĐiďle to kŶoǁledge aŶd of a tƌust that ͚fouŶds͛ all ƌelatioŶ 
to the other in testimony. This justice, which I distinguish from right, alone allows one the 
hope, ďeǇoŶd all ͚ŵessiaŶisŵs͛, of a uŶiǀeƌsalizaďle Đultuƌe of siŶgulaƌities, a Đultuƌe iŶ 
which the abstract possibility of the impossible translation could nevertheless be 
announced. This justice inscribes itself in advance in the promise, in the act of faith or in the 
appeal of faith that inhabits every act of language and every address to the other. The 
universalizable character of this faith, and not of another or before all others, alone permits 
a ͚ƌatioŶal͛ aŶd uŶiǀeƌsal disĐouƌse oŶ the suďjeĐt of ͚ƌeligioŶ.͛ϰϯ 
In this account, it is an originary faith which is the condition of possibility of the promise of justice to 
Đoŵe, iŶdeed oŶe ǁith ͚uŶiǀeƌsalizaďle͛ poteŶtial. 
Derrida͛s iŶǀoĐatioŶ of suĐh poteŶtial ďǇ ŵeaŶs of the eǀaĐuatioŶ of the ĐoŶteŶt of the ŵessiaŶiĐ iŶ 
favour of its structural promise, and the place of an originary faith which underpins this, provoke a 
series of problems. While his account has met with a variety of significant challenges,44 the most 
crucial in the present context is the possibility that the invocation of messianic thought, even that of 
Deƌƌida͛s ͚ǁeak͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ, ƌisks a ƌetuƌŶ to the tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal ďǇ ŵeaŶs of the ƌeifiĐatioŶ of 
standards and values which have been shown, as a consequence of the ongoing ruptures caused by 
the ͚Death of God͛, to ďe iŶdefeŶsiďle. TƌaĐiŶg the oƌigiŶs of ŵessiaŶiĐ thought ďaĐk to the Aǆial Age, 
Salvatore identifies at its core a relation described as the triad of ego-alter-Alter, which refers to the 
ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the suďjeĐt ͚ego͛, the kŶoǁŶ oƌ huŵaŶ ͚otheƌ͛, aŶd the diǀiŶe oƌ aďstƌaĐted 
͚Otheƌ͛. MessiaŶiĐ thought eŵeƌged, he eǆplaiŶs, thƌough a paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐoŶĐeptualisatioŶ of the 
relationship of care that is expected of the ego towards the earthly alter. Simply put, in messianic 
thinking, the subject owes a duty of care to the earthly alter, and this is located and justified via 
ƌefeƌeŶĐe to the diǀiŶe Alteƌ. The ŵessiaŶiĐ fuŶĐtioŶs to ͚ďƌidge the gap ďetǁeeŶ alteƌ aŶd Alteƌ … 
by projecting an obligation to care for alter onto the ego and the authority to sanction such a care 
oŶto the tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶt Alteƌ.͛ϰϱ IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, it is the figuƌe of the diǀiŶe Alteƌ that pƌoǀides the 
momentum for the relation of care ǁhiĐh eŵaŶates fƌoŵ the ŵessiaŶiĐ logiĐ: ͚The eŶgiŶe of the 
mechanism lies in the operation through which the terrestrial alter is projected onto the 
Alteƌ/Theos.͛ϰϲ 
The pƌoďleŵ ǁith this iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of the ͚Death of God͛ is that iŶheƌeŶt to ŵessiaŶiĐ thought is a 
return to precisely the transcendental justifications which have been, and continue to be, ruptured. 
As “alǀatoƌe shoǁs, ͚tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶĐe ďeĐoŵes iŵŵediatelǇ pƌeseŶt to the suďjeĐt, to ego, ďǇ 
instituting a privileged axis between the transcendent Alter, the divinity, and the concrete alter 
faĐed ďǇ ego iŶ the ǁoƌld.͛ϰϳ This is ďeĐause ŵessiaŶiĐ thought is ͚gƌouŶded oŶ the idea that the 
subject (the ego) gets entangled in a new realm of transcendence via the institution of a strong 
nexus between the transcendent Alter, a divinity with the character of omnipotence but also 
ŵeƌĐifulŶess, aŶd the ĐoŶĐƌete alteƌ faĐed ďǇ ego iŶ the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the ǁoƌld.͛ϰϴ Without suĐh a 
divine origin, the duty of care in the ego–alter relation has no authorising force, and hence breaks 
down. In short, without the figure, however abstracted, of the divine Alter, and a consequent return 
to transcendental promises or horizons, the messianic logic is not possible. What this means is that 
messianic thought necessarily relies oŶ God oƌ His seŵďlaŶĐe to pƌoǀide the ͚foƌ the sake of͛ of the 
politiĐal. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, I ǁould suggest that eǀeŶ Deƌƌida͛s ǁeak ŵessiaŶisŵ iŵpliĐitlǇ ƌelies oŶ 
such an authorising force for its conceptual coherence and its ethico-political injunction. It is thus 
that Deƌƌida͛s ŵessiaŶisŵ ͚seƌǀes to eleǀate ouƌ spiƌits. It is the toŶe of hope.͛ϰϵ “uĐh hope is 
afforded by a (re)turn to the comforts associated with divine authorship, however abstractly or 
loosely conceptualised; the vertiginous experience of self-authorship is soothed by this (however 
abstract and underdetermined) horizon or promise. As a result, all protestations to the contrary 
ŶotǁithstaŶdiŶg, Deƌƌida͛s ͚pƌiŵoƌdial faith͛ has faƌ ŵoƌe iŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ ǁith ŵoƌe tƌaditioŶal foƌŵs of 
messianic thought than might initially appear to be the case, insofar as messianic thought necessarily 
ƌelies upoŶ the authoƌisiŶg foƌĐe of aŶ Alteƌ ǁhiĐh ͚eŶtaŶgles͛ the suďjeĐt iŶ tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal logiĐs. 
As Dillon alludes, the messianic, while opening certain possibilities, has the effect of tying the human 
to the diǀiŶe.ϱϬ Deƌƌida hiŵself issues a peƌtiŶeŶt ǁaƌŶiŶg: ͚oŶto-theological reappropriation always 
remains possible – and doubtless inevitable insofar as one speaks, precisely, in the element of logic 
and of onto-theologiĐal gƌaŵŵaƌ.͛ϱϭ 
As well as reconnecting the subject with the transcendental, indeed, by means of such a recoupling, 
the messianic also functions to re-establish a connection with the earthly community, the bond with 
which is also continuously uŶdeƌŵiŶed as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of the oŶgoiŶg ƌuptuƌes of ͚Death of God͛. 
DilloŶ Ŷotes that the ŵessiaŶiĐ ͚is a soŶg to ďe suŶg ǁith aŶd oŶ ďehalf of the solidaƌitǇ of the 
shakeŶ͛, aŶd highlights its soĐial diŵeŶsioŶ: ͚the tƌaŶsfoƌŵiŶg ĐouŶteƌ-violent juridical appeal of 
aŶotheƌ justiĐe siŵultaŶeouslǇ opeƌatiŶg ǁithiŶ aŶd agaiŶst the laǁ.͛ϱϮ It thus seeks its ͚foƌ the sake 
of͛ ďǇ ͚ƌeaĐhiŶg outǁaƌd͛ toǁaƌds the tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ of the soĐial oƌdeƌ, ŵoǀiŶg toǁaƌds aŶ 
uŶattaiŶaďle justiĐe ͚to Đoŵe͛, ďǇ ŵeaŶs of the structural promise. However, this also presupposes 
the possibility of a shared horizon; it is this collective futurity which gives the messianic its tone of 
͚ƌeaĐhiŶg outǁaƌds͛ toǁaƌds a justiĐe ͚to Đoŵe͛. Yet Deƌƌida hiŵself is suspiĐious of suĐh hoƌizons: 
͚his ƌeasoŶ foƌ keepiŶg his distaŶĐe fƌoŵ the KaŶtiaŶ ƌegulatiǀe idea oƌ ŵessiaŶiĐ adǀeŶt is pƌeĐiselǇ 
ďeĐause theǇ aƌe hoƌizoŶs, a teƌŵ ǁhiĐh iŶdiĐates ďoth ͞the opeŶiŶg aŶd the liŵit that defiŶes aŶ 
iŶfiŶite pƌogƌess oƌ peƌiod of ǁaitiŶg͛͟.ϱϯ If, as Nietzsche claims, the shared horizons possible in the 
eaƌthlǇ ƌealŵ, ŵuĐh like the God ǁho has died, ǁeƌe oŶlǇ eǀeƌ pƌojeĐtioŶs of the ego͛s self-
sameness, the messianic appeal to an emancipatory promise rooted in or gesturing towards such 
justice is in seƌious daŶgeƌ of Ŷot oŶlǇ failiŶg to ŵaƌk the ǀioleŶĐe of the suďjeĐt͛s ďeĐoŵiŶg, ďut also 
projecting such violence outwards in the guise of a collectively pursued justice. By relying upon such 
horizons, whether divine or earthly, and however abstract, the messianic thus risks reintroducing 
precisely connections to the universal or given which, according to Nietzsche, and indeed Derrida, 
were always much more closely related to power than to truth or justice. It thus risks remaining a 
͚ŵoƌalitǇ plaǇ,͛ϱϰ opeƌatiŶg ǁithiŶ estaďlished poles of good aŶd eǀil. Thus, iŶ Deƌƌida͛s ŵessiaŶiĐitǇ, 
peƌhaps, God is oŶlǇ eĐlipsed; as MaƌtiŶ Buďeƌ Ŷotes, aŶ ͚eĐlipse is soŵethiŶg that oĐĐuƌs ďetǁeeŶ 
the suŶ aŶd ouƌ eǇes, Ŷot iŶ the suŶ itself.͛ϱϱ This speaks of the ͚ŵetaphǇsiĐal Ŷeed͛ ideŶtified ďǇ 
NietzsĐhe: iŶ Deƌƌida͛s fƌaŵiŶg, his ŵessiaŶiĐitǇ as a ͚faith ǁithout dogŵa ǁhiĐh ŵakes its ǁaǇ 
thƌough the ƌisks of the aďsolute Ŷight,͛ϱϲ iŶdiĐates its fuŶĐtioŶ as defeŶdiŶg the suďjeĐt fƌoŵ the 
depths of the abyssal condition it fiŶds itself iŶ as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of the oŶgoiŶg ͚Death of God͛. 
The twin dangers of turning back towards transcendental or earthly-communal shared horizons for 
guidaŶĐe aƌe fuƌtheƌ eluĐidated iŶ Tauďes͛ disĐussioŶ of the ͚pƌiĐe͛ of ŵessiaŶisŵ. As ǁell as its 
potential for animating radical social or political change of the kind he would be sympathetic to by 
pƌoǀidiŶg a ͚foƌ the sake of͛ ŵessiaŶisŵ, thƌough the opeƌatioŶ of its oǁŶ iŶteƌŶal logiĐ authoƌised 
ďǇ the Alteƌ, also ͚helps out the ĐoŶstitutioŶ of the modern agent of political order, i.e., the state, as 
the adŵiŶistƌatoƌ of the pƌofaŶe ƌealŵ of iŵŵaŶeŶĐe [ďǇ] ͞hold[iŶg] doǁŶ͟ eǀil … aĐĐoƌdiŶg to its 
so-Đalled ͞kateĐhoŶtiĐ͟ fuŶĐtioŶ.͛ϱϳ IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, the politiĐal uses of the galǀaŶisiŶg aŶd 
legitimating functions of the messianic are not delimited in advance; the authorising force 
uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg it ŵaǇ ďe used foƌ ͚ƌepƌessiǀe͛ as ŵuĐh as ͚pƌogƌessiǀe͛ politiĐal iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs. As a 
consequence of this internal logic, one of the prices of the messianiĐ is ͚the poteŶtial of ǀioleŶĐe 
incorporated both in the katechontic nature of the powerful European state and in its replica via 
)ioŶisŵ.͛ϱϴ CoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ eǆaŵples of this aƌe too Ŷuŵeƌous to Ŷote. The ŵessiaŶiĐ iŶ this ƌeadiŶg 
thus functions within and contributes to maintaining existing onto-political orders as readily as it 
(appears to) subvert them. Consequently Taubes explicitly cautions against the political 
operationalisation of messianism: 
historically speaking it is only via the realm of inwardness that the absurd and catastrophic 
ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of the ŵessiaŶiĐ idea aƌe to ďe aǀoided … If the ŵessiaŶiĐ idea iŶ Judaisŵ is 
Ŷot iŶteƌioƌized, it ĐaŶ tuƌŶ the ͚laŶdsĐape of ƌedeŵptioŶ͛ iŶto a ďlaziŶg apoĐalǇpse … Foƌ 
every attempt to bring about redemption on the level of history without a transfiguration of 
the messianic idea leads straight into the abyss.59 
While Derrida is careful to invoke as abstract and cautious a messianism as possible, I would suggest, 
contra Taubes and Derrida, that such refiguratioŶ of the ŵessiaŶiĐ to a ŵoƌe ͚iŶǁaƌd͛ ǀaƌiaŶt is 
insufficient to address the violence of Alter-authorship which is inescapably at work in, indeed is the 
hallmark of, the messianic. 
As this suggests, there is, as Dillon shows, a tragic dimension to Derrida͛s ŵessiaŶisŵ, ŶaŵelǇ his 
simultaneous invocation and refusal of an authorising structural promise animated by an abstracted 
Alteƌ oƌ faith as pƌoǀidiŶg the ͚foƌ the sake of͛ of the politiĐal: ͚OŶ the oŶe haŶd, Deƌƌida teaĐhes that 
we must distinguish between the monstrous and the lesser violence. On the other hand everything 
he teaches seems to say that we cannot. He is himself racked by the responsibility posed by this 
ƌadiĐal uŶdeĐidaďilitǇ.͛ϲϬ What this shoǁs is that ǁhile Deƌƌida tuƌŶs to the ŵessiaŶiĐ, he 
siŵultaŶeouslǇ shoǁs that ͚the adǀeŶt of the ŵessiaŶiĐ, of the Otheƌ, is itself ǀioleŶt aŶd ǁho ĐaŶ 
tell, how are we to tell, that the violence of the messianic may not itself evoke holocaustal violences 
fƌoŵ us?͛ϲϭ This suggests that the ŵessiaŶiĐ pƌovides no means by which its own necessarily violent 
authorising force may be exposed as such, presenting instead terms which reach towards exiting 
standards of good and evil, authorised by the (however abstracted) figure of the divine Alter. In the 
context of the oŶgoiŶg ͚Death of God͛, aŶǇ aŶd all ĐoŶfiguƌatioŶs of these aƌe ĐoŶtiŶuouslǇ shoǁŶ to 
be indefensible. The implications of this are far-reaching; as Houseman shows, there is a politics to 
suĐh a politiĐs of the pƌoŵise: ͚No loŶgeƌ ĐaŶ the ĐƌitiƋue of capitalism be content to wait, in hope, 
or faith, or certainty, for redemption: such hope has become conjoined, in the gas chambers of 
Auschwitz, to exactly that system of thought and practice that the critique invoked redemption 
agaiŶst.͛ϲϮ IŶ otheƌ ǁords, far from providing a solution to multiple forms of violent onto-politics, 
the guiding faith provided by the messianic is, in this reading, intimately connected to them. It is 
precisely the structure of the promise, and not just its content, that died with God: through the act 
of deiĐide, the paĐt of the pƌoŵise is dissolǀed, aŶd ǁith it the Đlaiŵ to a ŵessiaŶiĐ ͚to Đoŵe͛. The 
promise and God name the same ongoing loss. 
 
The TragiĐ aŶd the ͚Death of God͛ 
If the ͚Death of God͛ aŶd the death of the pƌoŵise invoke the same loss, the possibility of a politics 
authoƌised ďǇ aŶ Alteƌ ǁhiĐh ͚ƌeaĐhes outǁaƌds͛ toǁaƌds a ͚to Đoŵe͛ oƌ shaƌed hoƌizoŶ ;hoǁeǀeƌ 
undetermined and abstracted) would seem to be undermined. The isolation that appears to result 
from this may give rise to a form of self-authorship which is cautious as regards such external sites of 
ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ. “uĐh isolatioŶ ŵaǇ ďe ƌead as pƌoǀokiŶg a tƌagiĐ ͚tuƌŶiŶg iŶǁaƌds͛, aŶ atteŵpt to fiŶd 
meaning and self-author in ways which avoid seeking legitimation from collectively held principles or 
standards. The notion of the tragic has been the subject of recent debate in IR primarily, although 
not exclusively,63 in the context of Realist thought, in particular in conjunction with attempts to 
disentangle and rehabilitate the Classical tradition from its more parsimonious Structural variant.64 
While theƌe is ŵuĐh to ĐoŵŵeŶd aŶd to ĐƌitiƋue iŶ these aĐĐouŶts of the tƌagiĐ aŶd the latteƌ͛s 
broader salience as regards the study of global politics, this is beyond the scope of this paper. In 
seekiŶg out the poteŶtial ǀioleŶĐes assoĐiated ǁith the tƌagiĐ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of the ͚Death of God͛, 
the diverging accounts provided by Dillon and Nietzsche are particularly illuminating. 
Within tragic thought, according to both Dillon and Nietzsche, all access to defensible, externally 
justified authoring force is undermined; the experience of the tragic is one of isolation and 
ŵeaŶiŶglessŶess. This is ďeĐause the ͚foƌ the sake of͛ of the politiĐal is ƌadiĐallǇ uŶdeƌdeteƌŵiŶed; 
without the authorising force of the Alter or the promise, however conceived, indeed as a 
consequence of the ongoing rupturing of such relations, the vertiginous subject confronts its abyssal 
condition. It is this experience of the abyssal condition of existence that comprises the tragic. The 
hallmark of this condition is at once the imperative to self-create and the knowledge of the 
immanent violence of so doing. Consequently, Dillon argues that while the messianic provides a 
seŶse of ͚hope͛ aŶd aŶ ͚eleǀatioŶ of spiƌit͛, the tƌagiĐ has a soŵďƌe aŶd ŵelaŶĐholiĐ ƋualitǇ: ͚the 
knowledge at which we arrive through tragic order is a knowledge that makes us sad. It is a 
kŶoǁledge at ǁhiĐh ǁe ǁould ƌatheƌ ǁe did Ŷot haǀe to aƌƌiǀe. Its toŶe is pathos.͛ϲϱ IŶ this ƌeading, 
the experience of the tragic is a one which unsettles, undermines and overwhelms. A tone of 
ongoing loss is discernible in this reading. 
IŶ ŵaƌked ĐoŶtƌast to this, NietzsĐhe͛s aĐĐouŶt of the tƌagiĐ, faƌ fƌoŵ ďeiŶg aŶ uŶǁelĐoŵe oƌdeal, is 
framed as aŶ uŶeƋualled elatioŶ, as a teƌƌiďle aŶd daŶgeƌous ƌaptuƌe: ͚DioŶǇsiaŶ aƌt … ǁishes to 
ĐoŶǀiŶĐe us of the eteƌŶal joǇ of eǆisteŶĐe.͛ϲϲ It is, hoǁeǀeƌ, Ŷot siŵplǇ aŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of affiƌŵatioŶ 
ďut ƌatheƌ ͚the affiƌŵatiǀe pathos paƌ eǆĐelleŶĐe, ǁhiĐh I Đall tƌagiĐ pathos.͛ϲϳ IŶ this aĐĐouŶt, the 
tragic is experienced not simply as affirmation, nor only as a pain or loss, but rather as an exquisite 
interrelation of the two; it is the product (if such a thing were possible) of the impossible 
coincidence of these contradictory encounters. Insofar as it is affirmatory, this is a consequence of 
giving oneself up to the excruciating pain of the indefensibility and meaninglessness of existence; 
the more sensitive one is to such horror and violence, that is, self-authorship under conditions of 
foundationlessness, the closer to the enraptured experience of the tragic one is capable of getting. It 
is precisely the pain of existence which makes possible the Dionysian affirmative pathos. Far from 
wishing oneself to be elsewhere or otherwise, it is the most exhilarating and elating experience 
possiďle. IŶdeed, it eŶgeŶdeƌs the ͚aŶŶihilatioŶ of the oƌdiŶaƌǇ ďouŶds aŶd liŵits of eǆisteŶĐe.͛ϲϴ As 
NietzsĐhe puts it, it aŵouŶts to ͚Ŷot fƌeeiŶg oŶeself fƌoŵ teƌƌoƌ aŶd pitǇ, Ŷot puƌging oneself of a 
daŶgeƌous eŵotioŶ thƌough a ǀeheŵeŶt disĐhaƌge … ďut, oǀeƌ aŶd aďoǀe teƌƌoƌ aŶd pitǇ, ďeiŶg 
oŶeself the eteƌŶal joǇ of ďeĐoŵiŶg.͛ϲϵ As iŶspiƌatioŶ, this joǇ is eǆpeƌieŶĐed, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
NietzsĐhe, as ͚a peƌfeĐt ďeiŶg-outside-yourself with the most distinct consciousness of myriad subtle 
shudders and shivers right down to your toes; a depth of happiness where the most painful and 
sinister things act not as opposites but as determined, as induced, as a necessary colour within such 
a surfeit of light.͛ϳϬ 
Thus Dionysian tragic art, broadly understood, is, for Nietzsche, like Dillon, a painful experience; one 
eŶĐouŶteƌs heƌe, aŶd ǁithout defeŶĐe, ͚the teƌƌoƌ oƌ the aďsuƌditǇ of eǆisteŶĐe.͛ϳϭ But foƌ 
Nietzsche, while the pain may be felt as a dread or instinct to recoil, it is also, as well, experienced 
thusly: 
The stƌuggle, the paiŶ, the destƌuĐtioŶ of pheŶoŵeŶa, Ŷoǁ appeaƌ to us a ŶeĐessaƌǇ thiŶg … 
We are pierced by the maddening sting of these pains just when we have become, as it 
were, one with the infinite primordial joy in existence, and when we anticipate, in Dionysian 
ecstasy, the indestructibility and eternity of this joy.72 
Faƌ fƌoŵ aŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of loss, the tƌagiĐ is, theŶ, a Đƌeatiǀe pƌoĐess; the iŵpeƌatiǀe is: ͚Be as I aŵ! 
Amidst the ceaseless flux of phenomena I am the eternally creative primordial mother, eternally 
impelling to existence, eternally self-suffiĐieŶt aŵid this fluǆ of pheŶoŵeŶa!͛ϳϯ It teaĐhes that, ͚iŶ 
spite of the flux of phenomena, life at bottom is indestructibly poweƌful aŶd pleasuƌaďle.͛ϳϰ The 
experience of the tragic is, in one sense, a cessation of the mourning of the loss of God, reason, 
truth, knowledge, security and every other possible onto-politico-theological referent. This implies 
that the pain one feels when confronted with the tragic is not, as one might expect, a manifestation 
of the suďjeĐt͛s legitiŵate iŶstiŶĐt toǁaƌds self-preservation against the threat of an all-consuming 
ŶothiŶg, ďut ƌatheƌ a ŵaŶifestatioŶ of the suďjeĐt͛s teƌƌoƌ at haǀiŶg oŶlǇ itself left to confront. The 
tragic forces the subject to face, without atonement, forgiveness or redemption, the horrors for 
which it is always already responsible. It is nothing more or less than the removal of every 
justification, alibi and explanation for oŶe͛s eǆisteŶĐe. It is the giǀiŶg oŶeself up aŶd oǀeƌ to the 
sileŶt ĐaĐophoŶǇ of the aďǇss; the tƌagiĐ speĐtatoƌ ͚iŵagiŶes he heaƌs the iŶŶeƌŵost aďǇss of thiŶgs 
speakiŶg audiďlǇ to hiŵ.͛ϳϱ 
Tempting as it might be to remain here in such an enraptured space, and precisely because of the 
tƌagiĐ͛s iŶtoǆiĐatiŶg appeal, the politiĐs of this ƌespoŶse to the ͚Death of God͛ ƌeƋuiƌe iŶteƌƌogatioŶ. 
Far from functioning as an antidote to the immanent violence of be(com)ing or the authorising force 
of the messianic Alter, the tragic contains within itself various violences. It is, firstly, the case, as 
Mustapha Pasha shoǁs, that the tƌagiĐ loss assoĐiated ǁith the ͚Death of God͛ is oǀeƌǁhelŵiŶglǇ a 
Western experience, and, true to form, betrays the same universalising tendencies and privileging 
immanentisms of Western thought more broadly. He cautions: 
The modern subject is driven by a quest for autonomous self-creation, unavoidably to return 
to a void, unfulfilled and scandalously close to self-annihilation. The modern condition is one 
without substance. Meaning is what is poured into existence. But where does it come from? 
The deities of modernity come in various forms: self-aggrandisement, material progress, 
consumption, pleasure and, above all, self-mastery.76 
The self-creating tragic subject is thus implicated in a series of politically urgent questions, not the 
least of which is the danger of the fetishisms of Western modernity. The Alter is, here, simply 
ƌeplaĐed ďǇ these alteƌŶatiǀe ͚deities͛, ďǇ ǁhiĐh the suďjeĐt takes its bearings. In so doing, the 
subject becomes so entirely self-ƌefeƌeŶĐiŶg that it ŵistakes itself foƌ the esseŶtial oƌ the ͚huŵaŶ͛ 
and ignores the colonialisms of such essentialisation. Such a danger cuts right to the core of the 
Western philosophico-political tradition: the reification of the Western subject as the fount and 
authoƌ of the politiĐal is uŶdeŶiaďlǇ ǁidespƌead. As ‘oďďie “hilliaŵ Ŷotes, it is ĐƌuĐial to looseŶ ͚the 
obsession the Western Academic often holds of her/himself as subject, and to imagine 
herself/himself – for a while – as oďjeĐts iŶ the dƌaŵa of soŵeoŶe else͛s aǁesoŵe 
suďjeĐtifiĐatioŶ.͛ϳϳ 
The tƌagiĐ, pƌiǀilegiŶg as it does a ͚tuƌŶiŶg iŶǁaƌds͛, also ƌisks ďoth aŶ iŶadǀeƌteŶt politiĐal Ƌuietisŵ 
aŶd a ĐoŶseƌǀatisŵ, as NietzsĐhe͛s aĐĐouŶt of a ĐeƌtaiŶ ǁithdƌaǁal fƌoŵ the politiĐal assoĐiated ǁith 
the DioŶǇsiaŶ ƌaptuƌe shoǁs: ͚Flee, ŵǇ fƌieŶd, iŶto Ǉouƌ solitude! I see Ǉou deafeŶed ǁith the Ŷoise 
of the great men, and stung all over with the stings of the little oŶes.͛ϳϴ “uĐh a flight to solitude 
suggests a turning away from political life, and therewith the urgency of the political moment and 
the violence within which one is always already implicated. Turned inwards in its solitude, the tragic 
subject is free to revel in agonistic ecstasy, but this comes at the cost of responsibility. The tendency 
of the tragic to turn inwards can result in endless processes of exquisite self-torturing/pleasuring, 
writhing at the precipice of a self-styled abyss. Meanwhile, the political continues. Nietzsche marks 
this in his description of 
a lethargic element, in which are submerged all past personal experiences. It is this gulf of 
oblivion that separates the world of everyday from the world of Dionysian reality. But as 
soon as we become conscious again of this everyday reality, we feel it as nauseating and 
repulsive; and an ascetic will-negating mood is the fruit of these states. In this sense the 
Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have for once penetrated into the true nature of 
things – they have perceived, but it is irksome for them to act; for their action cannot change 
the eternal nature of things; the time is out of joint.79 
This ŵeaŶs, ĐƌuĐiallǇ, that ͚[k]Ŷoǁledge kills aĐtioŶ͛ ďeĐause ͚aĐtioŶ ƌeƋuiƌes the ǀeil of illusioŶ.͛ϴϬ IŶ 
other words, faced with the terror and absurdity of existence, the tragic subject finds intervention 
highly problematic; acting without recourse to knowledge or justice is experienced as an ordeal. 
Thus the tragic risks a fatalism towards, or an attempt at withdrawal from, the political, which 
results not in non-intervention, but, which is worse, tacit acquiescence to the status quo because 
intervention is always already in process, always, and especially, when one fails to take account of it. 
Importantly, it is also the case that, while pushing the boundaries of good and evil further, perhaps, 
thaŶ otheƌ ĐoŶĐeiǀaďle logiĐs, the tƌagiĐ is ultiŵatelǇ guiltǇ of a ƌetuƌŶ to pƌeĐiselǇ the ͚ƌeaĐhiŶg 
outǁaƌds͛ that it seeks to suďǀeƌt. Nietzsche frames the tragic as follows: 
[W]e are forced to look into the terrors of individual existence – yet we are not to become 
rigid with fear: a metaphysical comfort tears us momentarily from the bustle of the 
transforming figures. We are really for a brief moment Primordial Being itself, feeling its 
ƌagiŶg desiƌe foƌ eǆisteŶĐe aŶd joǇ iŶ eǆisteŶĐe … as the oŶe liǀiŶg ďeiŶg, ǁith ǁhose 
creative joy we are united.81 
“uĐh a ͚ŵetaphǇsiĐal Đoŵfoƌt͛ to ďe fouŶd iŶ a uŶitaƌǇ aŶd kŶoǁaďle ͚pƌiŵoƌdial ďeiŶg͛ poses 
pƌofouŶd ƋuestioŶs of the tƌagiĐ. IŶsofaƌ as the DioŶǇsiaŶ ƌespoŶse to the ͚Death of God͛ is iŶteŶded 
to ƌefleĐt a giǀiŶg of oŶeself oǀeƌ to ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐǇ aŶd the liŵitless ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ oŶe͛s ďeĐoŵiŶg 
that radical self-authorship implies, recourse to such comforting onto-theological categories is highly 
pƌoďleŵatiĐ. This is ƌefleĐted iŶ NietzsĐhe͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of the DioŶǇsiaŶ as ďeiŶg-outside-yourself, 
Ausser-sich-sein; the experience of Dionysian rapture is at its peak precisely at the instant it 
provokes the swelling sense of oneness, of unity with Being. Put differently, what is risked here is a 
return to the transcendental, not, as in the messianic, via a reaching out to divine or collective 
justice (to come) authorised by a more or less substantive Alteƌ, ďut ƌatheƌ thƌough the suďjeĐt͛s 
attempt to emulate or become a god. In this inward logic, it is the subject itself which must be the 
originator of value and meaning. It must, in short, perform the functions previously fulfilled by the 
divine. 
This theŵe of the suďjeĐt͛s aĐĐessioŶ to godhood is pƌeseŶt iŶ NietzsĐhe͛s thought iŶ a ǀaƌietǇ of 
foƌŵs. Fiƌst, theƌe is a ĐeƌtaiŶ ŵessiaŶisŵ ǀisiďle iŶ his tƌagiĐ ŵadŵaŶ: haǀiŶg pƌoĐlaiŵed ŵaŶ͛s aĐt 
of deicide, which falls on the deaf ears of the surrounding crowd, the madman 
thƌeǁ his laŶteƌŶ oŶ the gƌouŶd so that it ďƌoke iŶto pieĐes aŶd ǁeŶt out. ͚I Đoŵe too eaƌlǇ,͛ 
he theŶ said: ͚ŵǇ tiŵe is Ŷot Ǉet. This tƌeŵeŶdous eǀeŶt is still oŶ its ǁaǇ, ǁaŶdeƌiŶg; it has 
not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder need time; the light of the stars 
Ŷeeds tiŵe; deeds Ŷeed tiŵe, eǀeŶ afteƌ theǇ aƌe doŶe iŶ oƌdeƌ to ďe seeŶ aŶd heaƌd.͛ϴϮ 
‘elatedlǇ, aŶ apoĐalǇptiĐ toŶe is disĐeƌŶiďle iŶ NietzsĐhe͛s thought: he pƌeseŶts hiŵself as ďoth the 
apocalyptic agent of the ƌeǀaluatioŶ of all ǀalues aŶd the ͚destƌoǇeƌ paƌ eǆĐelleŶĐe.͛ϴϯ He siŵilaƌlǇ 
ƌefeƌs to the ͚eǀeŶt͛ of )aƌathustƌa as ͚the iŵŵeŶse aĐt of puƌifǇiŶg aŶd ĐoŶseĐƌatiŶg huŵaŶitǇ.͛ϴϰ 
The figure of the frenzied Dionysus becomes, in this reading, the man-god who is iŶspiƌed ďǇ ͚a ƌush 
of feeliŶg, of uŶĐoŶditioŶalitǇ, of poǁeƌ, of diǀiŶitǇ.͛ϴϱ Most ĐoŶĐƌetelǇ, NietzsĐhe siŵplǇ asks: ͚Do 
ǁe Ŷot ouƌselǀes haǀe to ďeĐoŵe gods ŵeƌelǇ to appeaƌ ǁoƌthǇ͛ of the aĐt of deiĐide?ϴϲ As Deleuze 
suĐĐiŶĐtlǇ puts it, ͚WhǇ ǁould ŵaŶ haǀe killed God, if Ŷot to take his still ǁaƌŵ seat?͛ϴϳ IŶ this 
reading, Ecce Homo may be understood as a sacrilegious new New Testament in the first person. 
The intersection of elation and despair characteristic of the tragic consists in the inevitable failure of 
the subject to comprise its own self-oƌigiŶ, that is, the suďjeĐt͛s iŶaďilitǇ to aĐt as oƌ ďeĐoŵe a ͚ŵaŶ-
god͛. This iŶeǀitaďle failuƌe to fulfil the ƌole of oƌigiŶatoƌ ĐaŶ ƌesult iŶ aŶ uŶǁittiŶg ƌetuƌŶ to the 
transcendental. This is visible iŶ NietzsĐhe͛s iŶǀoĐatioŶ of ďoth DioŶǇsus aŶd also the doĐtƌiŶe of the 
͚eteƌŶal ƌetuƌŶ͛. The highest, ŵost suďliŵe eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the DioŶǇsiaŶ tƌagiĐ is at oŶĐe a seĐƌet 
ƌeaĐhiŶg ďaĐk toǁaƌds the eteƌŶal oƌ tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal: the ͚eteƌŶal ƌetuƌŶ giǀes the ǁill a rule as 
ƌigoƌous as the KaŶtiaŶ oŶe.͛ϴϴ The suggestioŶ that the eteƌŶal ƌetuƌŶ ďeaƌs a Đlose ƌeseŵďlaŶĐe to 
the Kantian Categorical Imperative is not new.89 The significance of this here resides in the 
possiďilitǇ that the ͚uŶĐoŶditioŶal uŶiǀeƌsalitǇ of the categorical imperative is evangelical. The moral 
laǁ iŶsĐƌiďes itself at the ďottoŵ of ouƌ heaƌts like ŵeŵoƌǇ of the PassioŶ … This thesis of KaŶt – is it 
Ŷot, at the Đoƌe of its ĐoŶteŶt, NietzsĐhe͛s thesis at the saŵe tiŵe that he iŶ ĐoŶduĐtiŶg aŶ 
iŶeǆpiaďle ǁaƌ agaiŶst KaŶt?͛ϵϬ As I haǀe shoǁŶ elseǁheƌe, Deƌƌida͛s teŶsioŶ-ridden engagement 
with the Kantian Regulative Idea risks a similar (re)turn.91 The point is, then, that the tragic can 
render possible a re-entanglement in the transcendental or divine, points of reference precluded by 
the oŶgoiŶg ƌuptuƌes aŶd ƌaptuƌes assoĐiated ǁith the ͚Death of God͛. 
 
Conclusion 
The ͚Death of God͛, uŶdeƌstood as aŶ oŶgoiŶg seƌies of fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌuptuƌes, pƌoǀokes the uƌgeŶt 
ƋuestioŶ of the ͚foƌ the sake of͛ of the political. Within critical and Continental traditions in IR and 
associated disciplines, both messianic and tragic responses to the resultant aporetic condition have 
been articulated. This paper has argued that the messianic and the tragic contain within themselves 
tendencies to return to the transcendental in ways rendered indefensible by the ongoing challenges 
assoĐiated ǁith the ͚Death of God͛, the foƌŵeƌ iŶ its ƌeliaŶĐe upoŶ aŶ authoƌisiŶg Alteƌ, aŶd the 
latter insofar as it risks a potentially colonising self-referentiality, a political quietism, and, via the 
pƌoďleŵatiĐ pƌojeĐtioŶ of the suďjeĐt as ͚ŵaŶ-god͛, also a ƌetuƌŶ to the tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal. This ŵeaŶs, I 
would suggest, that the messianic reperforms too great an appeal to an authorising external force 
ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides too ƌeadilǇ a ͚foƌ the sake of͛. DilloŶ Ŷotes that the toŶe of Deƌƌida͛s ŵessiaŶisŵ is 
oŶe of hope, ƌeŵaƌkiŶg: ͚I ǁould that I Đould ďe peƌsuaded ďǇ that toŶe.͛ϵϮ It is, iŶ ŵǇ ǀieǁ, to his 
credit that he is not convinced. The immanent violence of be(com)ing, so readily reflected in 
contemporary political life, demands a restless vigilance as regards that which serves to comfort or 
reassure the subject that the political realm is oriented towards, even if it cannot attain, the promise 
of aŶ uŶdeĐoŶstƌuĐtiďle justiĐe ͚to Đoŵe͛. PolitiĐal aŶd ŵetaphǇsiĐal ƌeassuƌaŶĐe uŶdeƌpiŶŶed ďǇ aŶ 
authorising Alter does not, I would suggest, lend itself easily to a radically interventionary and 
affirmatory politics. 
Similarly, it is crucial to ensure that the tragic does not become an alibi for attempting to distance 
oneself from the urgency of political intervention, and that an engagement with it does not result in 
aŶ eǆplosiǀe ƌetuƌŶ to the tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal, iŶ the foƌŵ of ͚oŶeŶess ǁith pƌiŵoƌdial ďeiŶg͛ oƌ the 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ͚Ausseƌ-sich-seiŶ͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, I ǁould suggest that the tƌagiĐ͛s iŶheƌeŶt iƌƌesolutioŶ, its 
continuous turnings in on itself, the vertigo associated with a perpetual dissatisfaction which resists 
the temptation to resign oneself to, or iŵpose the fiŶal ͚is͛ of ŵeaŶiŶg, ƌetaiŶs iŵpoƌtaŶt ethiĐo-
politiĐal iŵpliĐatioŶs. The ethiĐal iŵpeƌatiǀe issued ďǇ the ͚Death of God͛ aŵouŶts to a Đall to 
ceaseless revision and vigilance as regards the imposition of onto-political principles and premises. 
The ceaseless turns and returns of the tragic function to continuously disrupt traditional forms of 
onto-politics which rely on fixed and stable subjectivities and ontologies. In other words, such 
failures amount precisely to a condition of possibility of political contestation. The tragic, by virtue of 
its recognition of the impossibility of any satisfactory knowledge or resolution in political life, thus 
provides an important intervention; far from losing the subject in the depths of an abyssal despair, 
such endless failure to finally self-create can amount to precisely a vital and vitalising site of the 
politiĐal. As Judith Halďeƌstaŵ ĐoŵŵeŶts, uŶdeƌ ĐeƌtaiŶ ĐoŶditioŶs, ͚failiŶg, losiŶg, foƌgettiŶg, 
unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, 
ŵoƌe suƌpƌisiŶg ǁaǇs of ďeiŶg iŶ the ǁoƌld … [F]ailuƌe alloǁs us to esĐape the puŶishiŶg Ŷoƌŵs that 
disĐipliŶe ďehaǀiouƌ aŶd ŵaŶage huŵaŶ deǀelopŵeŶt.͛ϵϯ Thus, ƌatheƌ thaŶ ƌegƌettiŶg the loss of 
the messianic hope, I would advocate an agitated and agitating politics animated in part by the 
pathos of the tragic and in part by possibilities which can emerge from endless deconstructive 
disƌuptioŶs to the logos. IŶ NietzsĐhe͛s ǁoƌds, as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of the ͚Death of God͛, ͚[Ŷ]othiŶg has 
become more alien to us than that old desire – the ͞peaĐe of the soul͟.͛ϵϰ 
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